DESI, Sedona and Barcelona

June 28, 2009

Gaudi building in BarcelonaGUEST BLOG

by Jason R. Baron

Reports from the DESI III Global E-Discovery/E-Disclosure Workshop at ICAIL 2009 and The Sedona Conference® International Programme on Cross Border E-Discovery and Privacy

Ralph has once again graciously provided me with this forum to report on two e-discovery-related events held in the past month in Barcelona: the “DESI III” Global E-Discovery/E-Disclosure workshop at ICAIL 2009, and The Sedona Conference® International Programme on Cross Border E-Discovery and Data Privacy.  Barcelona is of course home to the Modernist, Art Nouveau architect Antoni Gaudi (1852-1926), whose highly imaginative works are reflected throughout this posting along with scenes from Barcelona itself.

Detail of a Gaudi building

As faithful readers of this space know through Ralph’s various past blogs, I have been intensely focused for the past few years in fostering greater awareness on the part of lawyers on the subject of what constitutes a “reasonable search” for ESI in the context of civil litigation. What was obvious to me in 2003 remains obvious today: that a great need exists in the legal community to understand the problems and limitations of conducting keyword searches by traditional means, given the built-in inefficiencies involved, and that old ways of thinking about how to find relevant documents amongst an exponentially growing sea of ESI must be replaced by a new legal paradigm. Two of my chosen venues for “advancing the ball” in thinking about these problems have been through The Sedona Conference®, in volunteering as an Editor-in-Chief of the Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval in E-Discovery (2007) and Commentary on Achieving Quality in E-Discovery (2009); and through founding the TREC Legal Track, now in its fourth year.

DESI III

To a similar end, DESI III was the third workshop in a series of international gatherings aimed at bringing together lawyers and academics of various stripes, all interested in new ways of thinking about the problem of “search” and “information retrieval” in the legal domain. I am grateful to Ralph that he previously allowed me an opportunity to report on the DESI II workshop held in London in 2008 (see his past blog, “A Tale of Two ESI Forums”).

Casa ConvalescenciaThis year’s workshop was held amidst the Casa Convalesència, a part of a still-functioning hospital complex known as the Hospital de la Santa Creu I Sant Pau, that is designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site for the beauty of its architecture, especially its interior tile work. Leading off was a warm opening welcome by Dr. Hugo Zaragoza, of Yahoo! Research, who posed the question: why is it that linguistic knowledge has so little effect on relevance ranking in search engines? He went on to make the simple but profound point (repeated throughout the day), that the scientific community finds it to constitute still a very hard problem to find “meaning” in plaintext – even with everything accomplished to date in the world of information retrieval, natural language processing, and semantics. Simply put, computers do not “intuitively” know what to make of ASCII strings of text like “Pablo Picasso was born in Malaga, Spain” (which, if you think about it for a moment, is, at bottom, simply a sequence of ones and zeroes to the software that is trying to interpret it). Moreover, the information retrieval (IR) and AI crowds have a ways to go in coming up with reliable strategies in parsing the semantics of what we say. In my view, lawyers are best served when they are reminded of this underlying scientific reality.

Gaudi building interior in Barcelona

Those of my fellow e-discovery travelers who chose to venture to Catalonia and to this lovely venue were then treated to what many agreed was a world-class keynote given by Dr. David Evans, of JustSystems Evans Research, out of Pittsburgh. We invited David Evans in light of his well-known ability to synthesize scientific concepts in a fashion intelligible to mere mortals (like lawyers), and he did not disappoint. The major themes of his talk, titled “Linguistic, Cultural, and Behavioral Dimensions of E-Discovery,” can be gleaned from a study of his detailed and extensive PowerPoints. Starting with a brief recounting of the findings of the TREC Legal Track that Boolean searching has been shown to miss substantial numbers of relevant documents at least in certain contexts and queries, he went on to show the limitations of the “art” of searching in present day e-discovery, which include lower than hoped for “recall” (i.e., the percentage of responsive documents found out of the whole); failure to rank items by higher or lesser relevance; and incomplete classification of ‘privileged’ documents. On top of all of that, in most cases there is little or no attempt to analyze foreign-language material, except in a quite superficial fashion.

Gaudi Building interior in Barcelona

Dr. Evans believes that we need to use realistic approaches to accommodate the “uncertainty” that exists in foreign-language translation exercises, and that Boolean expressions are necessarily limited in what they can do. He believes the bench and bar should be better educated about the problems involved in searching, and that they should have greater awareness of what he terms the “special needs” of cross-language information retrieval. He shared certain ideas he had about how to adjust one’s search strategy to take into account differing “information densities” in texts and other forms of ESI produced in foreign languages and cultures. His bottom line: “e-discovery practices should take account of the linguistic and cultural-behavioral contexts of companies and individual workers.” I haven’t done justice to all of what David Evans spoke about, but urge a look at his PowerPoints and would hope that he will be doing more speaking and writing on these themes in the months and years to come.

The workshop continued with a morning “research papers” session, with speakers reporting out the results of some form of original research, modeling, or the use of new tools and techniques. Representing two teams of researchers at Xerox and Xerox Europe, Svetlana Godjevac and Caroline Privault summarized their papers on “Machine Learning Classification for Document Review” and the desktop categorization and visualization product known as “DISCO.”  Their combined emphasis was on greater use of clustering techniques and attorney coding and categorization, as a way to cut down in size the ESI volume problem and to produce more accurate results. Greater emphasis on clustering technologies as part of early case assessment appears to pay big dividends; based on anecdotal surveys of my private sector colleagues, however, my sense is that these techniques are only coming now in to some fair measure of use by law firms. (For a modest paper providing a checklist of tips on the subject of early case assessment search, clustering and filtering tools, I refer the reader to a short piece that Ronni D. Solomon, a rising e-discovery star at King & Spalding in Atlanta, and I did up for The Sedona Institute earlier this year. Ralph has been kind to cite it previously in this space even if he didn’t care for our cute title.)

Gaudi's Le Pedrera - exterior statutes

Next up were research papers by Dr. Hans Henseler of the Amsterdam University of Applied Services, on “Network-based filtering for large email collections in E-Discovery,” and Dr. Maria Esteva of the Texas Advanced Computing Center at the University of Texas, Austin, who submitted two papers for the workshop on behalf of her and her colleagues, and who presented on “Finding Narratives of activities through archival bond in electronically stored information (ESI).” Hans Henseler, an expert in forensic technologies and techniques, and Maria Esteva, based on her background in archival theory and information science, each provided welcome additional perspectives on how to attack the problem of finding meaning in large collections of ESI, including through the use of novel forms of statistical methods and what is known as “social network analysis” (SNA). As defined by Dr. Henseler, SNA constitutes “the mapping and measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations, computers, web sites, and other information/knowledge processing entities.” His paper set out how e-mail filtering technologies using straightforward statistical methods may be married up with SNA  in powerful ways to understand underlying patterns seen in the ESI data repository.

For her part, Maria Esteva demonstrated how archival theory could be brought to bear on e-discovery problems, especially in her use of the term “archival bond,” a “fundamental concept in archival theory and practice” which “describes relationships between documents as an essential property of documents.” Dr. Esteva went on to report of her experiments in finding relationships in and across documents using a statistical method of “paragraph alignment,” inspired by bioinformatics, as well as what she called a graphical user interface (GUI) providing links in a similar manner to SNA as described above. I am grateful to both Hans Henseler and Maria Esteva for coming to the workshop, and given the importance of their collective work will wish to collaborate with each in the future on ways to best utilize their  techniques in connection with the real world of e-discovery issues that readers of this column face every day.

Gaudi-Le-Pedrera-statuteRounding out the morning, Doug Oard and I presented a paper we worked on whose very promising lead author, Feng (Charlie) Zhao, unfortunately couldn’t join us at the workshop — as he was committed to finishing up his first year of law school back in Seattle (a second avocation he has pursued after already receiving a Ph.D. in Information Science)!  The research experiments for the paper, “Improving Search Effectiveness in the Legal E-Discovery Process Using Relevance Feedback,” constitute, so far as I am aware, the first known attempt to actually quantify the efficacy of  sampling, iteration and feedback loops in connection with lawyers’ exchanging and refining their Boolean search queries as part of the “meet and confer” process.

Our paper’s conclusion: it appears that statistically significant gains can be had if one adopts at least a two-time meet and confer process, where there is asymmetric knowledge of the actual contents of the ESI repository being searched (e.g., the paradigmatic case, where one side knows a great deal or is in a position to know about its ESI data set, and the other party is playing a version of “go fish” with much more limited knowledge). Assuming that parties are prepared to come to the table a first time to hash out the parameters of a search protocol, based on the responding party’s sampling results, the research – which concededly had to be conducted on a very limited universe of documents — showed that a second meet and confer to renegotiate (refine) the queries being used may well result in substantial gains in “recall.” But the research also found that further iterations were not as successful – that an asymptotic limit of sorts is reached after one re-negotiation round. Thus, our experiments do not support endless iterative loops – which should be music to the ears of judges who wish to put limits on the discovery process, and to opposing litigants (and their counsel) who really don’t wish to spend more time with each other anyway!

The findings of our paper provide an empirical basis to support more anecdotal observations that I and others have been making for some time about the importance of exploiting sampling, iteration, and feedback loops – starting with my co-authored article with George L. Paul, “Information Inflation: Can The Legal System Adapt?,” 13 Rich. J. Law & Tech. 10 (2007) (as also recounted in one of Ralph’s prior blogs), and most recently discussed at greater length in the previously mentioned Sedona Commentary on Achieving Quality in E-Discovery.  These findings also dovetail with the increasing chorus of judicial voices (e.g., Judge Grimm’s decision in Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe; Judge Peck’s in Walter Gross Construction; the D.C. Circuits’ now infamous In re Fannie Mae Litigation case, Judge Facciola’s O’Keefe and Equity Analytics decisions, etc.) who have been at various turns nudging, prompting, and urging parties to talk to each other about the parameters of the search of ESI to be conducted – and scolding them when they have failed to do so (or been oblivious to the prospect of doing so).  And, of course, negotiating search protocols is one of the major planks of The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation, of which I wlll have more to say below.

Lunch consisted of a lively discussion of themes from the day, carried out so as to mix lawyers, vendor types, and academics at each lunch table, with reports back from each of the table facilitators at the end of the day on how we can all best make progress in the area of search and information retrieval. My thanks to Conor Crowley of Daley Crowley LLP, Jan Puzicha of Recommind Inc., Stuart Rennie, Esq. (our sole Canadian representative, from Vancouver), Johannes Scholtes, ZyLab North America LLC, and Sonya Sigler, Cataphora, for assisting in leading those discussions and participating in the end-of-day formal panel.

Gaudi's Pedrera

Space does not permit a detailed recitation of the afternoon sessions’ papers, except to say that I urge readers of this piece to go to the DESI III page and follow the link to “Agenda, Papers, and Bios,” where the full range of 25 or so accepted workshop papers, many accompanied by PowerPoints from presenters, are available online. I do, however, wish to go out of my way to thank additional colleagues who were so gracious in finding the time to work up papers and presentations and come the long way over to Spain, including K. Krasnow Waterman of LawTechIntersect LLC, Simon Attfield of University College London (co-organizer of DESI II), Bill Butterfield of Hausfeld LLP, David Chaplin of Kroll Ontrack, Jorge Román and Shelly Spearing of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Bob Bauer and Chris Hogan, both of H5 (who together submitted two papers that were accepted at ICAIL and the DESI III workshop), and last but not least, my colleague, Doug Oard, at the University of Maryland, who graced us with some further remarks  on cross-language search for e-discovery.

The organizers would be remiss in not also thanking Dr. Giovanni Sartor, Marie-Curie Professor of Legal Informatics and Legal Theory, at the European University Institute of Florence, for agreeing to provide some brief remarks as a representative of the AI+Law community. The workshop was a great success through the combined efforts of all of the named individuals above, plus those who submitted papers which were accepted but who could not be present (including a special mention to Marissa Caylor, Class of 2010 at Boston U. Law School, my law school alma mater, who agreed to co-author with me a short piece on “Searching for ESI in the EU: Some Rules of the Road for the European Data Controller”).

Especially warm thanks are due to my fellow DESI III workshop co-organizers Jack Conrad and Dr. Marc Light, both of Thomson Reuters Research & Development in Minneapolis; Dr. Kevin Ashley, Professor of Law and Intelligent Systems at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law School;  and Debra Logan, of Gartner Inc. (who resides in and blogs from London on e-discovery), for all of their behind the scenes work necessary to put on a successful workshop, including reviewing this year’s research and position paper submissions. I would like the opportunity here to single out Jack Conrad, as fostering the connection with ICAIL – he both initially encouraged me to propose the DESI I workshop in Palo Alto as part of ICAIL 2007, and in turn spent considerable time and effort this year in ensuring the Barcelona workshop’s success as part of ICAIL 2009. I am also enormously grateful to Kevin Ashley, both for all of his past support and efforts, as well as for his announcement from the podium at this year’s workshop that he will be inviting selected participants from the DESI workshops to revise and expand upon their remarks, to be part of a special issue of the Artificial Intelligence and Law Journal coming out in 2010 devoted to e-discovery. His own co-authored position paper at the workshop on “Emerging AI+Law Approaches to Automating Analysis and Retrieval of ESI in Discovery Proceedings” is a mini-gem, well worth spending the time to read, and which I trust wlll form a kind of compass piece to the issues expected to be taken up in the AI+Law Journal special issue.

The Sedona Conference on Cross-Border and Privacy

Hotel ArtsAfter a day off touring with the family the Mediterranean coast north of Barcelona (I recommend to anyone a visit to the outrageous Salvador Dali Museum in Figueres, as well as a side-trip to the gorgeous seaside town of Cadaques), I returned to Barcelona in time for The Sedona Conference’s two day program on international cross-border e-discovery and privacy, held at the Hotel Arts (next to a giant sculptured whale).

I first wish to say that I am so very grateful to Richard Braman and Ken Withers, as well as to Jim Daley, who acted as chair of the Sedona event, for electing to co-locate Sedona’s international programme in Barcelona during the same week as the DESI III workshop. Doing so certainly fostered and encouraged the attendance at both of many of my friends and colleagues, themselves e-discovery luminaries, including, in addition to Ken Withers himself, Maura Grossman of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Jeane Thomas of Crowell Moring; Ted Barassi of Symantec; Deborah Baron, Autonomy; Chris May, ieDiscovery; Adam Bendell of FTI Consulting; and Macyl Burke, ACT Litigation, among others. I also wish to say that I cannot do justice in this space to reporting on the full richness of the papers and presentations set out at the conference, but only wish to highlight a few points.

Cadaques

The Sedona Conference programme included invitations to a number of high profile members of the EU and UK judiciary, including Dr. Alexander Dix, Commissioner for Data Protection & Freedom of Information in Berlin, Germany, who gave the Day 1 Keynote: “Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts – A Way Forward.” In his remarks, Dr. Dix went out of his way to emphasize how The Sedona Conference© has been a leading light in the development of commentaries and conferences aimed at clarifying the difficult issues involved. Participants also had the opportunity to hear from, among others, Dr. Waltraut Kotschy, Chairwoman of the Austrian Data Protection Commission, Dr. Hiroshi Myashita, Office of Personal Information Protection, Tokyo, Japan, and the Hon. Simon Brown, QC, Specialist Mercantile Judge, Birmingham Civil Justice Centre, Birmingham, England, to name just a few of a wide variety of speakers. I also would be remiss in failing to note what a “hoot” it is to be a participant in a room where the lively Sandra Potter, of Potter Farelly & Associates, of Melbourne, Australia, is moderating a panel.

Master Whitaker, Senior Master, Queens Bench Division, London, England, gave the Day 2 Keynote entitled “UK eDisclosure Developments As A Study in Contrast With US E-Discovery.” The title of his talk notwithstanding, I was struck again, as I was last year hearing him at the 2008 MIS International Conference on Digital Evidence chaired by Stephen Mason, actually of how similar the experiences of US and UK lawyers and judges are, at least in terms of what it evidently takes to be “getting up to speed” on the subject of constructing what constitutes a reasonable search protocol.  Indeed, Master Whitaker began his talk by putting forward the rhetorical proposition that for many lawyers in the U.K., it would seem perfectly acceptable to target one’s search of ESI using search terms of one’s own devising, without any prior discussion of one’s opponent’s thoughts. He went on to say that many would sign on to a second proposition, more or less, that what entails a “reasonable” search is whatever one does in connection with actually doing a search, as instructed by the client.

But, as he went on at great length to point out, in light of Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd & Ors v. Cable & Wireless & Ors, [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch), those propositions simply do not hold any longer. Digicel, in which the U.K. judge parsed virtually every search term in a Boolean query to decide whether it or a variant should be included in the proposed search, is a watershed kind of decision, much like Victor Stanley and others in the U.S., where it can no longer be said that the bench and bar are without notice of the limitations of search. I know that Chris Dale has spent considerable time on his own blog discussing the implications of Digicel, and I would commend his efforts for further reading. Master Whitaker spent the remainder of his time discussing a questionnaire that he has had a role in developing, which much akin to local rules requiring special formatting of Rule 16 or 26 joint reports or submissions in the U.S., plays the role of directing parties to think about a variety of ESI-related issues in their cases.

Park GuellI will end this blog with a thought based on a question I posed to Master Whitaker, which was in turn picked up as a theme addressed by the Hon. David Waxse, US District Court Magistrate Judge in the District of Kansas, near the end of the programme: To what extent would it make sense for the bench and bar in the U.K., or in the international legal community as a whole, to take up the cudgel in “signing on” to the The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation?  I understand that the current document may be U.S.-centric, but it could easily be “internationalized” in a more generic form.

It was obvious to some of us sitting in the conference room in Barcelona that, at least in some places around the globe, pushing this particular idea could be seen as both foreign and gratuitous.  (We all were made to understand, for example, that talking to the other side during a legal proceeding in Spanish courts is practically unheard of!)  And yet, in light of Digicel and the overall tenor of Master Whitaker’s remarks, I can’t help but think that fostering greater cooperation is one of the keys to being smart in the digital age – that the nature, volume, and complexity fairly demands it, no matter what country one is in and which judicial system may control. I would certainly applaud efforts to “internationalize” the Cooperation Proclamation along these lines. Some tapas for thought.  Anyone interested in continuing the discussion of why greater cooperation amongst lawyers can work in other countries, feel free to comment in this space, or drop me a separate line (jason.baron@nara.gov).


Textbook Case of Discovery Abuse Exposes a Fallacious “Pig in a Poke” Defense

June 21, 2009

pig in a pokeA Senior District Court Judge in Atlanta recently considered sanctions in what he referred to as a textbook case of discovery abuse: Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 2009 WL 1473708 (N.D.Ga., May 27, 2009). I agree. The nineteen page opinion by  Judge J. Owen Forrester describes the conduct of defendants and their attorneys. The core of the abuse was defendants’ pig in a poke defense where they argued that there was no way to know if any email of value existed on backup tapes, so it would be a mistake to spend the large sums of money needed to look. Clever argument, but for the fact that, according to Judge Forrester at least, defense counsel knew, or should have known, that there were lots of important emails on the tapes and so the argument was a con.

The conduct examined in Kipperman is reminiscent of the chameleon-like actions described in 1100 West, LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., Case No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2009), which I discussed in last week’s blog. Whereas 1100 West resulted in sanctions against the party and the law firm representing it, the amount of which has yet to be determined, the discovery abuses in Kipperman resulted in sanctions of over a million dollars, but against the party alone. Still, the conduct in Kipperman caused Judge Forrester to come very close to entering what he called “the largest default judgment sought by a defendant in the history of the nation,” and, as I point out in the conclusion, the case is not over yet. Kipperman v. Onex Corp., supra at 19.

Over Lawyered

There have been multiple orders entered in Kipperman before the opinion here at issue. It has been pending for over four years and has over 600 docket entries. I have written about the last major order entered in this case on September 19, 2008, in my article, Why E-Discovery is Ruining Litigation in America and What Can Be Done About It. Although Judge Forrester’s latest opinion is focused on the conduct of defendants and their counsel, he begins the opinion with a broad-shot against all of the parties and their legal counsel:

The lengthy discovery process, which has spawned four discovery hearings, has been contentious at best and abusive at worst, and the court has expressed its displeasure with the parties’ behavior on numerous occasions.

Following the official close of fact discovery, the court expressed its frustration with the proceedings in its March 19, 2008 Case Management Order. The court chronicled the parties’ missteps, noted that this matter was being “over lawyered” on all sides, made clear that it would not compel parties to comply with orders already issued by the court, and notified the parties that it was currently tallying their disobedience and would award sanctions at their request.

Id. at *1.

Search for Email on Fifty Backup Tapes

The plaintiff responded to this invitation by requesting a variety of sanctions against defendants, including the ultimate sanction of default. There were many discovery abuses described in plaintiff’s motion, but the core problem concerned electronic discovery issues revolving around email and “ten labeled and forty unlabeled backup tapes.” Id. at *6. Yes, this is another backup tapes sanction case involving thee whereabouts of missing email. In a nutshell, early in the case defendants produced very few emails in response to plaintiff’s initial request for production of electronic records for the time period in question by this lawsuit – 1999-2003. Defendants explained that they did not use email that much back then, that it was before they adopted BlackBerries, and very few remained in their active systems. They claimed that their tapes were “not reasonably accessible” and, as such, were excluded from discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Note that if defendants had not saved these tapes to begin with, they would not have had this problem. They are in effect paying a very high price for unwise retention policies and IT pack-rats.)

Defendants argued that any search of their tapes would be expensive, but unlikely to find any email of value, since they were not using email much back then anyway. That was the clients’ story and their attorneys were advancing it with a vengeance. Based on later findings made by Judge Forrester, one wonders whether they even asked the key witnesses whether this was true or not.

At first, the plaintiff apparently accepted the defendants’ word and did not push the point. But then the plaintiff received a production from a third party that included eighteen emails written by defendants. These emails strongly undercut defendants story that it was rare for them to use emails and BlackBerries at the turn of the century. Based on this discovery, the plaintiff moved to compel the production and search of the “ten labeled and forty unlabeled backup tapes” that defendants admitted they had and might contain emails.

Pig in a Poke

pig in a poke aka bagAt a hearing  on this issue, defense counsel argued that the restoration of the backup tapes should not be required because no one knew what was on those tapes. For this reason it would be foolish to require expensive restoration, since it would be like buying a pig in a poke.

… [W]e’re talking about somewhere around 380 to $410,000 worth of costs. And for what? No one literally knows. … So what we have is a pig in a poke, but for everybody. No one knows what’s in there.

Id. at *7. As we will see, Judge Forrester at first bought this argument, but then later, after some peeks into the bag (the poke), decided that the defendants and their counsel must have known all along exactly what was in there, and it was not good. It was not an empty bag. It was a bag full of vicious-cat-like incriminating emails.

The Court first had some sympathy for the pig in a poke argument and crafted a compromise order that allowed for sampling of two of the fifty backup tapes. This order, in effect, allowed the plaintiff to peak and see if the bag was empty, as defendants suggested it would be. Or if it had contents, whether it would be “pigs or cats in the poke.” To use the modern legal vernacular, whether the email in the backup tapes would be smoking guns or silver bullets.

The court directed Plaintiff to designate two tapes and design a search and directed Defendants to pay for it. The court made Plaintiff the guarantor of the search’s success, however, and granted Defendants the right to demand fees if it produced little discoverable material.

Id.

That seems like a fair decision. Only two out of the fifty tapes had to be searched and if defendants were right, and there was not much email use back then, the plaintiff would have to pay for the futile search. Further, if the search design proposed by the plaintiff was not reasonable and narrow in focus, the defendants could object and move for a protective order.

Lots of Cats Found in the Poke

cat.in.bagIt turns out that there were a lot of email on the two backup tapes, many of which were smoking guns detrimental to the defense. Here is Judge Forrester’s description of what happened next:

Plaintiff selected its tapes and provided its terms by January 16, 2008. Defendants performed a search on the two tapes, received hits resulting in thousands of documents, and began releasing documents to Plaintiff on a rolling basis. Defendants unilaterally decided to search seven witnesses’ mailboxes rather than the entire tape and decided to redact documents. Defendants chose the seven boxes of the individuals Plaintiff wished to depose. These were the witnesses Defendants believed had knowledge or had something to do with the instant matter. Defendants refused to search the hundred or so mailboxes of employees they believed were not related to the case. Plaintiff found Defendants’ production to be incomplete.

Id.

Plaintiff then moved to compel again, seeking search of all mailboxes and an additional backup tape thought to have a missing time period. This lead to another hearing where, according to Judge Forrester:

Defendants argued against an additional tape and contended that only a portion of the existing production was relevant. Defendants explained that the volume of the production was related to (1) the broad nature of Plaintiff’s search terms, (2) the fact that many of the e-mails contained spreadsheets with multiple blank pages, (3) the fact that attachments were reproduced every time an e-mail was forwarded or replied to, and (4) Plaintiff’s demand for every e-mail sent to or received by certain individuals including items they were copied on. Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the court that at least ten to twenty percent of the documents were extremely relevant, or the kind of documents that the Trustee would put on an exhibit list at trial. Defendants informed the court that it had cost them more than $600,000 to search the two tapes. This figure included attorney time for privilege review. Defendants never filed a protective order asking to be relieved of the burden of searching the entire tapes.

Id. at *8.

Note that even though Judge Forrester started off the opinion by saying that the case had been “over-lawyered,” he will hammer defense counsel here for not immediately filing a motion for protective order. The moral of the story is one we have seen in several prior cases —  if you want protection for expensive backup tape search, you need to file the motion before you do the work, not afterwards. See: In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, _F.3d_, 2009 WL 215282009 (D.C. App. Jan. 6, 2009).

Cats are Out of the Bag and they Bite

cat.viciousWhat really seemed to get to Judge Forrester was the nature of the emails discovered. Plaintiff argued that ten to twenty percent of the documents were extremely relevant, that is hot-docs, otherwise known as “smoking guns.” The judge read many of these emails himself to decide these motions and he found that the plaintiff was right.

The court itself examined examples of some of the e-mails produced to assess relevance: “I don’t consider myself enough of an expert on the law in this area to declare these to be smoking guns but they certainly are hot and they certainly do smell like they have been discharged lately.”(Tr. 04/29/08 54:10-13). The court stated that it would enforce its existing order but that it would give Defendants a chance to narrow Plaintiff’s search terms and provide Plaintiff with a list of employees, their positions, departments, etc., so that Plaintiff could agree to narrow the number of employee boxes that needed to be searched. The court also agreed to give Plaintiff an additional tape.

Id. at *8.

Judge Forrester would of course wonder how it is that defendants did not know about these emails all along. If the emails discovered hadjust been marginally important, the defendants story might have had some credibility. The plaintiff’s charge of a cover-up might not have rung true. But with so much email found, and much of it highly relevant, it stretches credibility to think this evidence was not well known to defendants all along. This may explain the court’s testy reaction to defendants failure to move for a protective order until after the fact. The comment in footnote four of the opinion as to a colloquy between judge and defense counsel is particularly interesting:

During the hearing defense counsel attempted to justify his earlier statements to the court about e-mail and justify Defendants’ actions. Defense counsel also conceded that Defendants should have asked for a protective order with respect to its initial production. The court said:

… I didn’t say come close. I said this is what you have to do. That’s an order of the court, and as an officer of the court you are obliged to follow that or to get a protective order to get relieved of that, and failing either, maybe you have to get rid of your client, I don’t know, but what I’m trying to explain to you is something that’s been said a lot before. Close doesn’t count in hand grenades, horseshoes and it doesn’t count here when you have to abide by an order of the court. …

Id.

After this hearing, the defendants searched the other custodians and other tape as ordered, and started to produce more emails. Plaintiff complained that they were not getting all of the emails they expected, and more motions followed, including this time a motion for protective order by defendants. Defendants argued that one of the search terms specified, “Armtec,” produced too many false positives. The judge agreed with them on that point and granted protection from production of those documents. But defendants also argued that they could withhold select documents uncovered by the other keyword search terms specified by plaintiff if they deemed them the hits to be irrelevant. Judge Forrester did not buy that argument, implying that defendants were, at this point, not to be trusted. Judge Forrester’s reasoning on this point is very instructive and worth a full reading:

Defendants certified their production as complete for the last time in December 2008. The court believes that some of the most interesting evidence in this matter has come from e-mail production. The court is deeply disturbed by Defendants’ handling of this production. The court recognizes the difficulties associated with electronic discovery and notably the difficulties in producing older documents archived on mediums which were not designed to withstand the rigorous searching associated with modern e-discovery. As such, the court does not fault Defendants for their initial refusal to produce electronic discovery from the so called “backup tapes” or for asserting legitimate legal arguments under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B) in their response to Plaintiff’s initial motion to compel this information.  The court does condemn Defendants, however, for making blatant misrepresentations about the value of e-mail discovery in this case in an effort to influence the court’s ruling, for refusing to follow the court’s ruling once made, and for behaving as if they, and not the court, got to decide what electronic material was relevant and discoverable under Rule 26 and what material was not.

Experienced defense counsel misrepresented the scope and value of e-mail discovery to this matter. The court has outlined the colloquy that occurred between it and defense counsel regarding e-mail during the January 9, 2008 hearing. Defense counsel notably argued: (1) “Plaintiffs don’t know and we don’t know whether there is a single e-mail on there, a single e-mail in any way related to this case”; (2) “[t]he fact that there are two or three emails that they have found in the Magnatrax documents would tend to indicate that there is a very low likelihood of any e-mails”; (3) “they didn’t even ask Mr. Wright, who they took as a 30(b)(6) witness, a single, you know, question about e-mail usage and what might be stored and what might not be stored”; (4) “[w]e are at the end of discovery, they finally decided … this is interesting to them. It hasn’t been critical until today, but now it’s critical”; and (5) “[w]e don’t even know whether people readily used e-mails. This was not a BlackBerry era at the time.”Counsel also relied upon an employee affidavit and argued that there would be considerable overlap of date on different backup tapes.

*10 The court relied upon these statements to make a determination under Rule 26(b)(2) as to whether Plaintiff had shown “good cause” to order discovery of the backup tapes, whether discovery of all of the tapes would be cumulative or duplicative, and in sum whether the burden or expense of the discovery outweighed its likely benefit. The court relied on these statements in crafting the “two tape” solution at Defendants’ expense with Plaintiff to bear the cost should the search ultimately be fruitless. Looking at the state of the record as a whole, it now appears that defense counsel’s statements were either purposefully misleading or made with a reckless disregard for the truth.

… The issue of backup email discovery was certainly not something that Plaintiff only became interested in on the eve of a discovery deadline. Second, both Plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel were aware that the parties involved in this case used e-mail. … This e-mail indicated that at least one of the relevant parties was using BlackBerry technology at this time, and such technology is synonymous with the regular use of e-mail. Despite defense counsel’s assertions it is clear that Plaintiff’s counsel did discuss e-mail usage and retention with Nigel Wright during Onex’s 30(b)(6) deposition. (Id. Ex 5, at Ex A). Further, the court finds it absolutely inconceivable that defense counsel did not know in January of 2008, more than two years into the case and more than one year into full discovery, whether his client readily used e-mails. Any competent counsel should be expected to ask his client such questions in the infancy of discovery. If counsel did not know, it was because he did not wish to know, and reckless indifference to the truth of a matter is a close brother to willful omission or misrepresentation. FN6

FN6. The court finds it notable that Defendants’ legal team chose to have local counsel argue the e-mail portion of the hearing. Local counsel likely had the least personal knowledge about the workings of Onex and Magnatrax and the least daily telephone and face contact with the clients. Therefore, the court can conceive of a situation in which local counsel had not had discussions about e-mail usage with his client. Regardless, he was responsible for being familiar with the state of the record. Further, his co-counsel were responsible for ensuring that he made no misrepresentations to the court or for correcting any made.

Id. at *9-*10.

Fool Me Once, Shame On You;
Fool Me Twice, Shame On Me

The chameleon attorneys have now been exposed. Judge Forrester now knows who he is dealing with. This, in part, explains the harsh sanctions that resulted, in spite of the fact that Judge Forrester clearly recognized the difficulties associated with electronic discovery in general and backup tapes in particular.

If defense counsel had acted independently from their clients, and been forthright about the problems, then, in my opinion, sanctions could have been avoided entirely and they would not have alienated the presiding judge. That is never a smart thing to do. The truth contained in the email would still have come out, but that is as it should be. The job of a lawyer is to argue the meaning of facts and the consequences that should flow from them, not to hide or change the facts. If the defense had been handled differently, the whole process would have been far less prejudicial to defendants. Moreover, the judge would likely have restricted discovery and the whole process would have been far less expensive and aggravating.

Eleventh Circuit Sanctions Law

Judge Forrester spends the first sixteen pages outlining the facts of discovery abuse. In the last three pages he explains what the law in the Eleventh Circuit requires him to do under these troubling circumstances. He begins with the rules.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g) was “designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions.” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir.1993). Rule 26(g) states:

(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record…. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:

(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and (*17)

(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is: (i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law; (ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action. ….

(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.

“The decision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) is not discretionary,” and “[o]nce the court makes the factual determination that a discovery filing was signed in violation of the rule, it must impose ‘an appropriate sanction.’ ” Id. at 1372. The court does have considerable discretion in determining what sanction is appropriate. Id. However, an order imposing costs under Rule 26(g)(3) should be limited to the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation. Id. at 1372 n. 45.

District courts enjoy substantially more discretion in deciding whether and how to impose sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Id. at 1366.A district court may impose sanctions against a party which violates a discovery order “as are just.” Id. …

Id. at 16-17.

Judge Forrester then examines the additional authority he has under the common law to impose sanctions.

*18 A court may also sanction litigation misconduct using its inherent power “to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., No. 08-11026, 2009 WL 613603, *5 (11th Cir. Mar.12, 2005) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)). The court must exercise its power, however, with restraint and discretion. Id. “The key to unlocking the court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith,” and a party may demonstrate bad faith by delaying or disrupting litigation or hampering the enforcement of a court order. In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir.2006). A party is entitled to due process before a court determines that the party has acted in bad faith and the court invokes its inherent power to impose sanctions and assess fees. Id. at 1306. “Due process requires that the party be given fair notice that its conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why.” Id. at 1306-07.A party can be given fair notice by either the court or the party seeking sanctions. Id. Once a party has notice that it might be subject to sanctions, the court must afford it the opportunity to justify its actions either orally or in writing. Id. …

Id. at *18.

Textbook Case of Discovery Abuse

Judge Forrester then makes the statement on textbook case that I have chosen as the byline for Kipperman v. Onex Corp.:

The court regards the instant case as a textbook case of discovery abuse. The court finds that Plaintiff has been prejudiced in two ways-the Trustee has been denied all the documents necessary to depose witnesses and prepare expert reports and the Trustee’s preparation has been made disjointed and difficult and it has been forced to expend a fair amount of time and money and effort to get that which should have been more easily obtained. … Defendants’ only defense is their unpersuasive argument that they have now complied and Plaintiff has suffered no prejudice. Defendants’ defense completely ignores the burdens the court and Plaintiff have endured to garner their compliance and the destructive precedent this court would set were it to allow Defendants to escape the consequences of three years of bad behavior simply because they believe they have now complied.

Id.

Stated Reasons for the $1,022,700 Sanction

Judge Forrester then explains why he decided to only award monetary sanctions, albeit in an amount of $1,022,700, and not simply enter judgment for the plaintiff.

*19 Plaintiff has asked the court for the ultimate sanction. Given the Defendants’ behavior, the court is tempted to grant Plaintiff’s request. That being said, the court will not strike Defendants’ answer. The court believes there are novel issues of liability present in this matter. Further, the ad damnum clause in this case is hundreds of millions of dollars. Were this court to avoid trying this case on the merits, it might be granting the largest default judgment sought by a defendant in the history of the nation. As this matter currently stands, Plaintiff has the raw material and documentation it needs to proceed with its case and this court has the means, through re-depositions and supplemental expert reports, to minimize a large portion of the damage done. The court is simply unwilling to take the dramatic action of striking Defendants’ answer and entering default in the face of moderate prejudice. That being said, Defendants should not and will not go unpunished. The court will exercise its discretion under Rules 26 and 37 and its inherent powers to award monetary sanctions.

Id. at *19.

Conclusion

Sanctions in an amount of $1,022,700 are not minor, but in view of the total amount at issue here, they are not really that severe. Some may think that defendants got off too lightly. But, please remember, the case is not over yet. Indeed, it is about to go to trial. There will be other consequences for the behavior of defendants and their counsel. Judge Forrester will, after all, be making many more rulings just before, during, and after the trial.  Once a lawyer has been “outed” as a chameleon, there is no turning back. It is also likely that the jury will learn about some or all of the defendants’ textbook discovery misconduct during this case. The final punishment for defendants’ misconduct will be welded by the judge and jury ruling on the ultimate merits of this case.

Unlike a default sanction judgment, which carries a high risk of reversal on appeal, a final judgment entered after a full trial to a jury on the merits is very difficult to overturn. All experienced trail counsel understand that the risks of appeal often enter into a judge’s decision. Judge Forrester’s ruling may appear to be lenient, but after the trial is over and the jury has spoken, the wisdom of his mercy will be obvious. He has read the email, the smoking guns that defendants tried so hard to hide. No doubt he is confident that justice will be done once a jury reads them too.


Law Firms Threatened by Fat Chameleons

June 14, 2009

chamelionChameleon attorneys are lawyers who blend with, act, and think just like their clients to a fault. They do not disagree with them, even when they are wrong and obviously need legal guidance. They are mere yes-men. Chameleon attorneys accept their clients’ unlawful schemes instead of trying to persuade them to change their ideas and actions to conform to the law. Chameleon attorneys do not exercise independent judgment as a lawyer. They just try to rationalize and hide. Chameleon lawyers are not real lawyers at all. They may look good and sound good, but there is no substance in their words. It is all a disguise designed to hide and protect their clients. They change colors from day to day, client to client. Wherever they go, they do and say just what the client wants to hear, not what the law requires. Chameleon lawyers will say and do anything to please their client, include lie to opposing counsel and the court. They then try to justify their actions under deluded notions of zealous service and devotion to their clients.

Chameleon lawyers perform a severe disservice not only to our system of justice, which is based on lawyer honesty and integrity, but also to their clients. The clients often think they are being served, and served quite well. They are then shocked when those services later lead to a default judgment or worse. In litigation, we have long had another, more blunt nick-name for such lawyers. It pertains to the world’s oldest profession.

chameleons

Since chameleon attorneys almost always agree with their clients, their Johns, they are naturally well liked by the people and corporations they serve. The clients may feel like they are being served way beyond their expectations. They are pleased to pay them well for their services. Clients may even start to believe that that is what all good lawyers do. For this reason, some chameleons become quite successful and develop fat books of business. They help law firms to prosper financially, at least in the short term, and so firm management is often tempted to overlook their moral and professional shortcomings. This is a big mistake.

Chameleon attorneys are not only dangerous to their clients and to our system of justice, which depends on the legal profession to guide, not hide, but also to the law firms that employ them. One large law firm in Indianapolis, Indiana, recently discovered this the hard way when they read the final default judgment entered by U.S. District Court Judge Larry J. McKinney in 1100 West, LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., Case No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS (S.D. In. June 5, 2009).

1100 West v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish

Judge McKinney entered a default judgment against that law firm’s client, the Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., as a sanction for its discovery violations. That’s bad for law firm business, but it gets worse. The Judge also awarded attorneys fees and costs against the client and the law firm. He also bluntly labeled their lawyers as mere chameleons, indistinguishable from their clients. Here is the court’s conclusion at page 63 of the judgment:

The Court concludes that Red Spot’s conduct can only be described as contumacious, wilful, and egregious. BME compounded the problem by, like a chameleon, becoming indistinguishable from its client and allowing Red Spot, namely Storms and Henry, to evade the truth. Through its defiant conduct, Red Spot has forfeited the right to have the issues determined on the merits. Therefore, the Court must conclude that only the most onerous sanction, default, can remedy Red Spot’s violation of the rules of discovery; Fed. R. Civil P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi); 37(c)(1); or can remedy Red Spot’s complete disregard of the legal process as protected by the inherent authority of the Court. Greviskes, 417 F.3d at 758-59. The Court, therefore, GRANTS 1100 West’s Motion for Sanctions.

Judge McKinney’s ruling should be a wake-up call to law firms everywhere. They must take steps to train and police their attorneys, even shareholders, even ones with big books of business. No attorneys handling contested matters should be permitted to succumb to the temptation of chameleon-like over identification with clients such that they help them to evade the truth.

This temptation most often comes in discovery, both paper and electronic (in this case it was paper), because that is the time in the litigation process when some clients want to hide the truth. This is when the morale fiber of an attorney is tested, when you discover if you are Man enough to stand up to a powerful client who pays your bills. A real lawyer has the courage to distinguish them-self by providing honest advice on the law, even if that is not what the client wants to hear. A real lawyer is not co-opted by dishonest plans. This may not make you popular with naive clients, but our system of justice depends on the truth tellers and is endangered by the chameleons.

Chameleon

The desires of litigants to hide the truth is understandable. After all, they are caught up in a battle and they hire a lawyer to advise them on the law. If the lawyer goes along with their desire to  evade the truth, then it must be lawful. No, I do not blame the clients. I blame the chameleon lawyers who mislead their clients by not guiding them to do what the law requires, disclosure of the truth. I applaud Judge McKinney for his honest, blunt talk and ever tougher action. I predict more judges will follow. They are fed up with chameleon lawyers. Law firms need to take heed of the sanctions and killer publicity the Indianapolis firm suffered as a result of their chameleons.

You do not want to have to make public statements after the fact, like this firm did. According to the Indiana Lawyer Daily, and the ABA Journal, the managing partner of the firm issued a statement after the ruling saying:

This remains a pending matter and we intend to work diligently to seek an appropriate resolution. We have taken this matter extremely seriously and took prompt action to address the issues described in the Court order. The two principal litigators involved in this case are no longer associated with the firm.

Chameleon

No longer associated with the firm. High time. Yet, for how many years were these same lawyers tolerated? The firm should have looked at them more closely long before this. According to the Indiana Lawyer, two of their partners were “asked to leave late last year because of this case.” Another partner still remains with the firm under undisclosed conditions. Another associate named in the 101 West opinion is no longer listed on the firm’s website. The blog, Practical Paralegalism, claims that the named associate was fired. The fate of the paralegal named in the opinion is unknown. So too are the amount of sanctions the firm will have to pay. That awaits further hearings, but it will likely be quite substantial.

Law Firms Must Guide, Not Help Hide

The defendants in this environmental contamination case were trying to hide the fact that they had used chemicals called TCE and PCE at their paint and varnish factory. That was the failed big cover-up that led to these sanctions. It was obvious to the judge that the defendant’s lawyers went along with their client’s hide-the-ball scheme. The law firm’s explanations were lame at best, even though some were creative, especially their attempt to blame the disappearance of key documents on questionable astrophysics:  “documents fell into a black hole and [BME was] not aware of the fact that [it] had the documents other than in the limited capacity of the very limited review.” Id. at 14. So much for the black hole defense!

escher lizards mandala

Here is the Judge’s findings concerning the law firm’s chameleon handling of its discovery responsibilities in this case. Judge McKinney’s description of the law firm’s activities (identified in this quote as BME), including shareholders, associates, and paralegals alike, bears close scrutiny:

But, BME, through both Cueller and VanRheenan and, to a lesser extent, Lucas, had opportunities to steer Red Spot, particularly Henry and Storms, on a different path and it never did. If all BME had was one individual who wished to ignore a small amount of information, it would be one thing. In this case, however, the evidence that Red Spot had used TCE and/or PCE was too pervasive for BME to continue to ignore. …

At this point, BME had heard enough deposition testimony, had questioned enough of Red Spot’s discovery responses itself, and had heard enough information from historical employees to guide Red Spot to make complete disclosure about any use of TCE or PCE on the property that it knew so that the lawyers could argue and a fact finder could determine the merits of the case. Yet, BME pressed on with Red Spot’s litigation strategy that neither of those two materials was ever used on the Red Spot property. On March 28, 2007, BME filed a brief in which it asserted that Red Spot had never used TCE. …

But, Cueller and Henry had just been refreshed about the fact that Red Spot had used Super Ad-It, which contained 10% PCE. Apparently, this made no difference because Storms testified on May 24, 2007, that Red Spot did not use TCE or PCE on its property. Cueller represented Storms at this deposition. Again, BME had an opportunity to guide Red Spot to make a complete disclosure and it did not.

On May 25, 2007, Henry and/or Cueller contacted several Red Spot employees to inquire about TCE and PCE usage at Red Spot. Jones told them he was sure PCE was used in the lab degreaser. (Pl.’s Ex. 48, at BME00142.) Jansen concurred. (Id. at BME00144.) The time frame of Jones’ and Jansen’s recollections was from 1968 to 1980. (Id.) Cueller was aware of this information. But she never disclosed it to 1100 West in responses to discovery requests or in response to this Court’s order to supplement discovery, and she never encouraged Henry to explain what she had learned in her next Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. …

Even given that VanRheenen’s health was suffering at this time, Klein, a highly knowledgeable associate, and at least one paralegal knew about the file and did nothing. Cueller’s failure to keep track of an associate’s work on the case in the absence of VanRheenen is equally troubling, particularly when Cueller was the self-proclaimed “litigation counsel.” Red Spot and BME cannot make an argument to the effect that the waste manifests in the EPA RCRA file were outside the time frames specified by 1100 West’s discovery requests. Again, this was another opportunity for BME to guide its client to make disclosures, but BME did not.

In addition, BME attorneys had sat through Henry’s depositions, BME attorneys had questioned the thoroughness of Henry’s production of documents, and a BME attorney had physically visited the room where Henry had searched for documents. Even in the face of Storms’ insistence that Red Spot did not currently use TCE or PCE, there was enough historical information for BME to insist that Red Spot dig deeper. Being a zealous lawyer does not mean zealously believing your client in light of evidence to the contrary. Moreover, when BME obtained the EPA RCRA file, there is no excuse for BME’s failure to ensure that “responsive” documents therein did not get to 1100 West.

The Court notes that it may be unusual to sanction a law firm for conduct that violates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in this case, where three partners of the firm had knowledge of its client’s apparent disregard for those rules and failed to properly supervise an associate and paralegal who had knowledge of adverse facts that remained undisclosed to the opposing party, the Court can only conclude that the firm must be held accountable under its inherent authority to deter such conduct in the future. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45.

In summary, at least starting in the summer of 2006, BME skated the edge of its responsibility to its client, to 1100 West, and to the Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to disclose relevant information as well as information likely to lead to relevant information. BME also failed in its responsibility to be candid with the Court by making statements in Court filings that it knew were misrepresentations at best and false at worst.

This kind of behavior by lawyers undermines the American system of justice, depending as it does on the honesty and candor of the legal professionals who work in the system. The judge was forced to impose harsh sanctions on both the clients and the law firm. The entry of a default judgment, waiver of privilege, and imposition of liability for fees and costs on both client and attorneys is very severe, but to let the law firm off with a warning, and “boys will be boys” smile, sends the wrong message. Those days are over. Law firms need to clean up their act before the judges do it for them in a decision like this.

U.S. v. Cinergy, et al.

Judge KcKinney has seen lawyer misconduct before, all judges have. But misconduct in high-stakes environmental cases was especially fresh in Judge McKinney’s mind. He had issued an order just a few months earlier in another pollution case, U.S. v. Cinergy, et al. Case No. 1:99-cv-1693-LJM-JMS (N.D. In. Dec. 18, 2008), where he concluded that:

Cinergy and its lawyers committed misconduct when they failed to disclose a consulting agreement (the “Agreement”) Cinergy had entered into with one of its fact witnesses, Robert Batdorf (“Batdorf”); when they allowed Batdorf to testify at trial that he was unemployed and emphasized that misstatement in front of the jury; and when Cinergy relied on the misrepresentation as a theme during the trial.

Judge McKinney then ordered the attorneys for Cinergy to appear before him for the possible imposition of disciplinary actions against them (but not their law firm):

Pursuant to Southern District of Indiana Local Rule 83.5(f), Southern District of Indiana Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement V, and the inherent authority of the Court, Cinergy and each one of its counsel of record as of May 5, 2008, shall appear before the Court to SHOW CAUSE why Cinergy’s counsel should not be suspended immediately from practice before this Court, and why Cinergy and its counsel should not be ordered to pay for plaintiff’s, the United States of America, and plaintiff-intervenors’, the State of New York, the State of New Jersey, the State of Connecticut, Hoosier Environmental Council, and Ohio Environmental Council (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), attorneys’ fees for bringing this matter to the Court’s attention through a Motion for New Trial. Each of Cinergy’s attorneys of record as of May 5, 2008, shall submit on or before Friday, January 9, 2009, a written statement of his or her knowledge of the Agreement including a date upon which such information was made known to him or her.

Tough talk to be sure, but at the hearing the judge was lenient. Although he set aside the judgment, he imposed no sanctions against the attorneys. This is explained in his January 3, 2009, Order:

The publishing of this and prior orders is sufficient. Further proceedings would create time consuming litigation threatening to overtake the issues of the case and draw time and energy away from the Court’s and the attorneys’ task of bringing this litigation to a close with as little delay as possible. No disciplinary action is recommended by this Court.

The Court reminds counsel that ours is a system of dispute resolution that relies very heavily on the integrity of the means and on the empirically sound and historic theory that if the means are just the end is just. The means upon which we all rely include the rules of evidence, the rules of procedure and the rules of professional conduct. While we sometimes narrowly refer to the system as a whole as an adversary system, we are all called upon to remember that a lawyer has a duty of candor to the court, not just a duty of advocacy for the client. In an effort to zealously advocate for the client, lawyers can forsake their duty of objectivity and become like chamaeleons, indistinguishable from their clients. It is upon this over advocacy that the Court blames the otherwise untenable position that an individual who has signed a consultant agreement and is being paid some $200.00 per hour plus expenses can wholly truthfully state that he is unemployed. Whether this is sanctionative non-professional behavior as well as over advocacy is not a question this Court will pursue further on the facts before it. For this reason no further action will be taken against any of the three mentioned lawyers.

Obviously, the publishing of this and prior orders was not sufficient to deter such conduct by attorneys in Indianapolis as Judge McKinney had hoped. This background helps explain why he reacted with no mercy to different attorneys in the 1100 West case. He had by then learned that chameleon attorneys have no ears to hear his warnings. They are deafened by greed and misguided notions of zealous advocacy.

be a real lawyer, not a chameleon

Judge McKinney correctly surmised that the only way to stop chameleon attorneys is to get the attention of their law partners and hope they will stop them. That he did with the monetary sanctions against the law firm in 1100 West. Judge McKinney’s strategy apparently worked because the firm admits that at least some of its professionals who were involved with the discovery in the case are no longer associated with the firm.

Conclusion

Money talks and big money screams. I predict that relatively big money sanctions will be awarded against the Indianapolis firm later this year. Law firms throughout the country will sit up and take notice of 1100 West v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish, if they have not already. Management will take better care to know the reputation of its litigators, not just their numbers. They should listen to any subtle and not so subtle hints that judges may give to them about their performance and moral integrity. If either are lacking, firms should take immediate remedial action. It is not only the right thing to do, it is prudent risk management. Does that mean fire them all? No. Certainly not. And one cannot help but wonder if the Indianapolis firm would have taken a different approach if the economy had been better.

escher.lizards

No, the answer lies in training and counseling. It lies in developing a strong firm culture of integrity, not just profitability. Every associate should be taught straight out of law school that “being a zealous lawyer does not mean zealously believing your client in light of evidence to the contrary.” They should be taught by both words and deeds that lawyers must guide, not hide.

All participants in the justice system – lawyers, judges, and paralegals alike – must understand the difference between Man and chameleon. They should understand what can happen when fat chameleons invade a firm. 1100 West shows that chameleons can not only lead to default judgments, but also monetary sanctions and shame against the firm. Ethics programs should get real and speak plainly as Judge McKinney has done in 1100 West and as I try to do each week in this blog.